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Price clustering is a well-documented regularity of foreign exchange transac-
tions. In this paper, I present new empirical evidence of price clustering for
central bank interventions. A feature of the price clustering in Swiss National
Bank (SNB) transactions is market dependency. Evidence of clustering in
the broker market is considerably smaller than in the dealer market. The
empirical analysis for Swiss interventions uses a disaggregate approach to
test the hypothesis whether intervention strategy matters. The most impor-
tant determinants of price clustering are bank size and transaction volume.
While the regression evidence for customer transactions is consistent with
the eﬃciency hypothesis, the clustering results for intervention trades are
not inﬂuenced by the SNB’s intervention tactics.
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1Introduction
Price clustering is a well-documented regularity of foreign exchange trans-
actions. Sopranzetti and Datar (2002), Grossman et al. (1997), and Good-
hart and Curcio (1991) ﬁnd that indicative quotes for currencies end mostly
with either a ‘zero’ or a ‘ﬁve’. Goodhart and Figliuoli (1991) observed that
round numbers are disproportionately represented in bid-ask spreads for ma-
jor currencies. Osler (2000) notes that published support and resistance
levels used for technical analysis of the major currencies are frequently num-
bers that end in zero or ﬁve. In a later study, Osler (2003) documents strong
evidence of price clustering in currency stop-loss and take-proﬁt orders.
This paper’s objective is to extend the price clustering analysis in the
foreign exchange market to central bank interventions. A ﬁrst task is to de-
termine whether central bank interventions suﬀer from clustering behavior?
Although the intervention literature surveyed by Edison (1993) and Taylor
and Sarno (2001) is silent on the issue of price clustering and central bank
intervention, Grossman et al. (1997) and others have identiﬁed price clus-
tering with increased market volatility through larger spreads. If so, then
price-clustered interventions may amplify uncertainty; thus generating the
opposite eﬀect intended by central banks. Such activity is consistent with
2the empirical evidence in Dominguez (1998). She ﬁnds that central bank
interventions heighten exchange rate volatility.1
A further issue concerning the intervention-clustering nexus is interven-
tion tactics. Chiu (2003), Lecourt and Raymond (2004), and Neely (2001),
in their surveys on intervention practices, note that the monetary authori-
ties pursue heterogeneous intervention tactics. If central bank interventions
exhibit price clustering, does this arise endogenously because of market condi-
tions at the time of an intervention or are there elements of the intervention
strategy (i.e., timing, transaction size, or trades with speciﬁc banks) that
inﬂuence the degree of rounding? In the latter case, if central banks are con-
cerned about price clustering and the consequences of heightened exchange
rate volatility, market microstructure argues that certain tactical decisions
could inﬂuence the degree of clustering observed in intervention trades. For
example, Harris (1991) argues that large sized transactions motivates the in-
centive to search for ﬁner prices. This implies in the extreme case that high
volume interventions are traded at ﬁner prices than small volume transac-
1There is a large literature on exchange rate volatility and central bank interventions.
The the references can be found in Humpage (2003) and Dominguez (2004). See also
the information based model of Naranjo and Nimalendran (2000) that links unexpected
interventions with wider spreads to unexpected interventions.
3tions. This would be one channel where intervention design inﬂuences the
degree of price clustering. Alternatively, if price clustering found in interven-
tion trades is strictly endogenous to the timing of the intervention, then the
intervention tactics deﬁned by intervention size or other factors should have
no inﬂuence.
To shed light on the question whether intervention tactics inﬂuence the
level of price clustering in central bank transactions, the empirical analysis of
Swiss interventions from 1986 to 1995 uses a disaggregate approach. While
central banks are frequently pricetakers in the dealer market when executing
their intervention trades, the disaggregate regressions are able to determine
if price clustering is associated with non-price elements that the central bank
controls during an intervention trade: i.e., counterparty, transaction volume,
timing, location, or repeated interventions. The disaggregated data are from
the oﬃcial transaction slips of the Swiss National Bank (SNB).2 Although
the study’s focus is on interventions, customer transactions are also used to
highlight distinct features between the dealer and the broker market.
2Transaction prices and volume have been used in numerous studies, which examine
the eﬀectiveness of SNB interventions: Fischer (2003a, 2003b), Fischer and Zurlinden
(1999), Paine and Vitale (2003), and Pasquariello (2002). New is the information on the
counterparty bank of the SNB trades.
4The paper is organized as follows. Section one discusses institutional is-
sues and the transactions data used to test for price clustering. Descriptive
evidence of price clustering is also oﬀered in the same section. Thereafter
in section two, the empirical strategy is deﬁned and the testable hypothe-
ses for the intervention strategy are speciﬁed. The regression results of the
disaggregate approach are presented in section three. Section four concludes.
1. SNB Transactions in the FX Market: 1986 to 1995
The empirical analysis considers two types of SNB transactions: foreign
exchange interventions and customer transactions. Both types of transac-
tions are discussed in detail in the next sub-section. This is then followed
by preliminary evidence used to motivate the empirical framework in section
three.
SNB Transactions: Some Institutional Features
The SNB intervenes to inﬂuence the trend of the exchange rate or to
counteract market disturbances. Solidarity with other central banks has also
been an important motive in the past because almost all interventions were
coordinated. This motive is further underscored by the observation that
the scale of the SNB interventions tended to be small and SNB governors
5have expressed skepticism on several occasions about the eﬀectiveness of such
operations. This however does not imply that the SNB has always followed
the lead of the Federal Reserve and the Bundesbank. These two central
banks have intervened more frequently than the SNB has.
SNB interventions are conducted via telephone correspondence in the
dealer market with foreign and domestic commercial banks operating in sev-
eral Swiss cities.3,4 It is common for the SNB’s trading desk to gather binding
quotes from commercial banks before executing an intervention transaction.
The SNB’s activity in the dealer market is limited and should be treated
as a pricetaker. Supportive evidence of pricetaking behavior is observed by
comparing intervention trades with bid-ask quotes retrieved from the work
notes of SNB dealers: in every instance the SNB trades were executed at
the ask price on orders to buy dollars and at the bid price on orders to sell
dollars.5
3The major city is Zurich followed by Basel, Geneva, and Lugano. Other locations on
a minor scale include Zug and St. Gallen.
4Telephone correspondence represents the norm. Neely (2001) in his survey of oper-
ational issues for 22 central banks ﬁnds that most central banks conduct their interven-
tions through telephone correspondence. Other possibilities include electronic brokers (i.e.,
Reuters 2002 or EBS) or direct dealing with counterparties via electronic communication.
5The (unoﬃcial) work notes of the SNB dealers are available only from 1992 to 1995
6The SNB communicates its interventions directly with the counterparty.
After the intervention trade has been completed, the SNB informs the trader
of the commercial bank that the transaction is an intervention. According
to SNB oﬃcials, the intervention announcement spreads swiftly across the
dealer market. The SNB makes no formal declaration to news agencies that
it is intervening. The SNB in most cases will be asked by a newswire service
if it has intervened, in which case an SNB spokesman will conﬁrm or refute
the intervention claim.
The SNB’s intervention strategy may be described as following a shotgun
tactic. An intervention session is characterized by numerous intervention
transactions of small volume. The volume per transaction is most often
either $5 or $10 million.6 The sessions, which begin with trades with the
Big Banks, followed by small Swiss banks and then foreign banks domiciled
in Switzerland, are generally completed within 10 to 30 minutes.7 With this
tactic, the intervention’s news is disseminated in the dealer market.
and cover only 36 trades.
6Only on rare occasions was the transaction’s size over $20 million.
7Big Banks is an expression frequently used in Switzerland to denote a select group
of large Swiss banks. For the analyzed sample they include Union Bank of Switzerland,
Credit Suisse, Swiss Bank Corporation, and Volksbank.
7The second type of SNB trades is customer transactions.8 These are pur-
chases of U.S. dollars triggered by the Swiss government’s request for foreign
currency. If the government needs other foreign currencies, the SNB buys
these currencies with U.S. dollars in the market. The government’s currency
requests thus result in a dollar outﬂow. In turn, the SNB compensates this
outﬂow by repurchasing U.S. dollars against Swiss francs either directly from
small domestic banks or through the BIS.
Customer transactions, as opposed to interventions, are brokered transac-
tions via telephone correspondence. This means, unlike for the intervention
trades, no quote gathering process takes place. It is thus not the SNB’s
intention to inﬂuence the Swiss franc with these type of transactions. The
SNB has some scope in timing the customer transaction. As such, customer
transactions are more likely to be performed when exchange rate volatility
is low as opposed to interventions. Further, customer transactions are not
split up as are interventions. It is only on rare occasions that the SNB will
conduct more than one customer transaction per day. This means they are
8This is the term coined by Fischer and Zurlinden (1999). It is somewhat unconven-
tional, because the actual customer transaction is the purchase of (other) foreign currencies
for dollars on behalf of the government.
8generally large volume transactions. Under these procedural arrangements
(i.e., speed of transaction, counterparty type, transaction volume), it may be
expected that customer transactions are less subject to price clustering than
are interventions.
Descriptive Evidence of Price Clustering in SNB Transactions
Descriptive evidence of price clustering in SNB transactions is oﬀered to
motivate the disaggregate approach. The sample, as in the empirical regres-
sions of section three, is from 1986 to 1995. The sample’s size is determined
by data availability. The SNB’s records for its transactions do not go beyond
1986 and the last SNB intervention was conducted on 15 August 1995.9
Table 1 documents the evidence for the last digit of SNB transactions in
the CHF/USD exchange rate. The upper half of the table provides evidence
for interventions, whereas the lower half is for customer transactions. The
former should reﬂect clustering in the dealer market, whereas the latter in
the brokerage market. Price clustering is the result of the use of a coarse
pricing set in which only a small fraction of the full set of potential prices are
actually used. The evidence of price clustering in the odd and even ending
9A further consideration is the deﬁnition of customer transactions. Shortly after 1995,
the SNB booked diﬀerently its customer transactions with the federal government.
9digits is not as pronounced as those ending in zero or ﬁve. Hence, the analysis
will focus on the latter form of clustering.
The evidence of price clustering in zeros and ﬁves is considerably stronger
for SNB interventions than for SNB customer transactions. The percentage
for total interventions in Table 1 ﬁnds that roughly 80% of the transacted
exchange rates end in either a zero or a ﬁve, whereas for total customer trans-
actions the percentage is 40%. These percentages for the zero and ﬁve digits
are not as high as the 91% found by Pasquariello (2002) for the CHF/USD
exchange rate quotes in the dealer market. Moreover, he ﬁnds that the zero
quotes (78%) dominate the ﬁve quotes (13%) by a margin of six to one,
implying that there is clustering for even ending-digits as opposed to odd-
ending digits. The evidence in Table 1 does not support such asymmetric
behavior of SNB transaction prices.
Table 1 also divides the price clustering evidence along several dimensions.
The ﬁrst is interventions into purchases and sales of U.S. dollars. The same
cut for customer transactions is not made since all of these transactions are
dollar purchases. The results show that the direction of the intervention does
not inﬂuence the price clustering result. Also of interest is the clustering of
10refused bid-ask quotes during the intervention sessions from 1992-1995.10
Although the number of observations is limited (and therefore the evidence
should be treated with caution), it says that the SNB does not discriminate
between the zero and ﬁve ending digits versus the others in accepting or
refusing oﬀers during the intervention round. This can be interpreted as
weak evidence that the clustering of intervention trades is dependent on
market conditions in the dealer market and is not inﬂuenced by intervention
tactics.
A further sign of clustering in intervention transactions is that none of the
end digits is close to the expected 10% level. The percentages for the digits
‘2’, ‘3’, ‘7’ and ‘8’ lie below 5% followed by the digits ‘1’, ‘4’, ‘6’, and ’9’,
which border ‘0’ and ‘5’, are even below 1%. This information is consistent
with the resolution hypothesis of Ball, Torous, and Tschoegl (1985), which
says that price clustering is the achievement of an optimal degree of price
resolution.
10The sample of 33 refused bid-ask quotes in Table 1 do not represent all the refused
quotes in the 1992-1995 period. The quotes stem from the (unoﬃcial) work notes of the
SNB dealers and should not be regarded as complete. Again, direct comparison with
customer transactions is not possible for quote gathering does not take place for customer
transactions.
11If the price resolution theory were correct, one would ﬁnd symmetry be-
tween odd and even ﬁnal digits and that the ranking of the ﬁnal digits would
be 0, 5, (2=3=7=8), and (1=4=6=9). This result is supported by the sign
tests for interventions (but not for customer transactions) recorded in Table
2. The result for interventions is at odds with the evidence in Goodhart and
Curcio (1991) for exchange rate quotes.
An issue in many empirical studies is that price clustering varies over time.
Gwilym, Clare and Thomas (1998), for example, show that intraday price
clustering is strongest during the opening and closing of the futures market
for FTSE 100 index contracts. These are the hours when trading is most
intense. Figure 1 shows the same intraday information for SNB transactions.
The hourly breakdown ﬁnds that the zero and the ﬁve frequencies are quite
stable throughout the day. An exception is the lower clustering frequency
of late hour trades in customer transactions. One explanation is the low
number of customer transactions in the late afternoon: 68% of the customer
transactions were conducted in the morning hours from 8:00 am to 12:00 am
o’clock.
An alternative form of time variation that inﬂuences the degree of price
clustering is along the calendar domain. Figure 2 shows annual frequency
12patterns of the zero and ﬁve end digits. The clustering frequency for inter-
ventions rises slowly between 1986 and 1992 and is volatile thereafter. The
high volatility at the tail end of the sample is marked by the fact that the
SNB did not intervene in 1993 and that few interventions were carried out in
1994 and 1995.11 Also, the frequency of price clustering in customer trans-
actions appears to be time varying. It falls noticeably in the years from 1989
to 1994.
The descriptive analysis ﬁnds strong evidence of price clustering for in-
tervention trades, whereas the level of clustering for customer transactions
is less pronounced. To determine whether the clustering of interventions
is inﬂuenced through intervention tactics determined by counterparty type,
time, or volume an empirical framework handling the disaggregate data is
ﬁrst outlined in the next section.
2. The Empirical Framework
A probit model is used to test competing hypotheses that explain the
11Grossman et al. (1997) also present evidence of increased price clustering over time.
They show an increase in the use of odd-eighth quotes for Nasdaq securities from 1 January
1993 to 31 December 1994.
13clustering phenomena of SNB transactions in the CHF/USD currency mar-
ket. The disaggregated speciﬁcation deﬁned for interventions is as follows (A
similar variant of equation (1) is considered for customer transactions):
St = b0 + b1BigBankt + b2DomBankt + b3Loct (1)
+ b4Repeatt + b5Timet + b6V olt + t,
where the dependent variable, St, is +1 if the transacted exchange rate ends
in a zero or a ﬁve, 0 otherwise. Next, the explanatory variables are deﬁned as
follows: BigBankt is +1 if a Big Bank is the counterparty to the transaction,
0 otherwise; DomBankt is +1 if the transaction is with a Swiss bank, 0 if
it is with a foreign bank; Loct is +1 if the counterparty bank is located in
Zurich, 0 otherwise; Repeatt is +1 if the transaction is repeated in the same
day, 0 if it is the ﬁrst intervention; Timet is the time of the transaction; and
V olt is the size of the transaction. Last, t denotes the error term.
Under the null hypothesis that intervention tactics of a pricetaking central
bank should not matter, this implies the non-price elements that the central
bank controls should have no bearing on the level of clustering. To reject
the null hypothesis, a set of coeﬃcients in equation (1) need to be signiﬁcant
14and stable across the diﬀerent regressions.
Interlinked in this discussion of intervention tactics and transaction type
is the negotiation eﬃciency hypothesis by Harris (1991) and Grossman et al.
(1997). The eﬃciency hypothesis says that if buyers and sellers are eager
to speed up the negotiation process of their transactions, then they will not
quibble over small increments in price. In a similar manner, the central bank
in its intervention operations prefers to choose round numbers to minimize
time and error in their communication with dealers.12 In the SNB’s interven-
tion strategy, the quick dissemination of news is an important prerequisite
for a successful intervention. Once the patterns of communication are estab-
lished, Osler (2003) argues that rounding may be self-reinforcing even in the
presence of rational speculative activity.
For interventions and customer transactions, the eﬃciency hypothesis
says that there should be no observable diﬀerence in the timing, type of
commercial bank, and location for transactions of the same size. Hence,
these variables should not be signiﬁcant in equation (1). However, as the
12This evidence would also be supported by the hypothesis that agents prefer certain
numbers for purely behavioral reasons, see Yule (1927), possibly because they are easiest
to process, cognately.
15transaction’s volume increases, the incentives of the pre-established pricing
pattern deﬁned under the eﬃciency hypothesis diminish. Smaller transac-
tions should thus observe a larger occurrence of rounding (i.e., b6 < 0 in
equation (1)), because larger transactions would beneﬁt the most of precise
pricing. Because speed and timing are important features of interventions as
opposed to customer transactions, it is expected that the volume impact de-
ﬁned by the eﬃciency hypothesis is stronger for customer transactions than
for interventions.
3. Empirical Results of Foreign Exchange Clustering
The regression results conﬁrm the descriptive evidence oﬀered in Figure
1 and Table 1. The clustering result with SNB transactions holds for the
dealer and the broker market, however the importance of the transaction’s
attributes diﬀers across markets. For the intervention trades, the tactical
factors are either not signiﬁcant or give mixed results across the diﬀerent
regressions. I interpret this as evidence that the non-price elements under
the control of the central bank have no inﬂuence on clustering in intervention
trades. For customer transactions, however, the disaggregate regressions ﬁnd
stable coeﬃcients for transaction volume and brokered trades with the BIS.
16These results are consistent with the eﬃciency hypothesis.
Table 3 summarizes the regression results for SNB interventions. The
analysis depends on disentangling the directional eﬀects of transaction’s char-
acteristics on price clustering. For example, a negative coeﬃcient for the
volume variable, β6 in equation (1), suggests that increasing volume size will
decrease the probability of price clustering in SNB transactions; a positive
value implies the opposite.
The main observations are the following. First, location, time, and re-
peated interventions are not statistically signiﬁcant in the diﬀerent variants
of equation (1).13 This suggests that tactical choices of geographical location,
timing, and frequency of interventions are not associated with rounding.
A second observation is that as intervention volume increases so does
clustering in the ﬁnal zero digit. This variable is positive and signiﬁcant for
the ﬁnal zero digit, but negative and insigniﬁcant for the ﬁve digit. The
combined impact for the zero and ﬁve digits is also positive and signiﬁcant.
Sopranzetti and Datar (2002) ﬁnd similar evidence for indicative quotes for
13The insigniﬁcance of the variable Repeatt is also true for alternative deﬁnitions of
Repeatt, i.e., +1 after 5 minutes after the ﬁrst intervention. Hourly dummy variables in
place of the time variable were also considered. These were also insigniﬁcant.
17six currencies against the US dollar. This result for V olt is not consistent
with the eﬃciency hypothesis, which would expect a ﬁner price setting to
occur as intervention volume increases.
An open issue is whether the positive correlation between intervention
volume and clustering arises from increased intervention intensity. In this
case, a positive correlation and not a negative correlation would still be con-
sistent with the eﬃciency hypothesis, because greater intervention activity
requires greater speed in transacting. Three checks were carried out. The
ﬁrst test was to determine if the positive correlation held even after dropping
the three intervention days in which the SNB intervened on its own. This
meant dropping 67 observations from the sample’s 706. The second was to
rerun the regression of the ﬁrst check but without the ﬁrst intervention for
the 63 intervention days. The third was to discard days when intervention
volume exceeded the sample’s median of $100 million; i.e., 23 intervention
days. For all tests, no change in the coeﬃcient’s sign was observed. This
conﬁrms the view that the eﬃciency hypothesis is inconsistent with price
clustering in SNB interventions.
The third observation drawn from Table 3 regards the inﬂuence of bank
structure on price clustering. The role of Big Banks does not appear to
18matter, but the domestic bank variable, DomBankt, gives mixed signals. In
most regressions for the zero digit, DomBankt enters negatively and signif-
icantly. The opposite result holds for the ﬁve digit. In this case, domestic
banks demonstrate a tendency to round. Whether this diﬀerence in behavior
reﬂects alternative practices of strategic pricing between foreign and domes-
tic banks is a question that cannot be answered. In the case for zero or ﬁve
digits, the two forces cancel each other.
Next, the comparative results from the broker market using customer
transactions are presented in Table 4. The choice of variables is slightly
diﬀerent from those previously discussed in Table 3. The counterparty vari-
able, BISt, now deﬁnes the bank structure. This is because small domestic
commercial banks were primarily the counterparty in customer transactions,
except for those with the BIS. This made the location variable redundant,
because almost all transactions were conducted with small commercial banks
located in Zurich, except those with the BIS in Basel.
The results show that the BIS variable mitigates the degree of price clus-
tering in all regressions. This suggests possibly that the SNB obtains ﬁner
price oﬀers through the BIS. Also for all regressions in Table 4, the coeﬃcient
for the volume variable is negatively signed. Volume is signiﬁcant in the ﬁnal
19zero digit and the combined case of zero or ﬁve. This evidence for customer
transactions is consistent with the eﬃciency hypothesis. As in the case for
interventions, the variables capturing timing eﬀects and same day eﬀects are
found to be insigniﬁcant in most regressions.
4. Concluding Remarks
The paper’s contribution is to present new evidence of price clustering in
the foreign exchange market using transactions data from the Swiss National
Bank. Intervention trades and to a lesser extent customer transactions ex-
hibit price clustering in the foreign exchange market. The SNB evidence is
consistent with results found in Goodhart and Figliuoli (1991) using bid-ask
spreads, Osler (2000) using published support and resistance levels for techni-
cal analysis, and Osler (2003) using stop-loss and take-proﬁt orders. Despite
the recognition that the objectives motivating the central bank transactions
diﬀer from those generated by proﬁt-oriented commercial banks, similar pric-
ing properties are observed.
The pronounced evidence of price clustering in the dealer market com-
pared to the broker market raises the issue if clustering in intervention trades
are strictly endogenous to the timing of the intervention or if the central bank
20is able to dampen the level of price clustering? If price-clustered interven-
tions are determined by market conditions, then any intervention strategy
may amplify uncertainty through clustering rather than instill the intended
calm in the FX markets. Alternatively, if the timing, size, or counterparty
type matters, then the central bank’s intervention strategy may have some
bearing on the level of price clustering.
The disaggregated regressions ﬁnd that transaction volume and bank
structure are the most important factors explaining the clustering in SNB
trades. While the inﬂuence of transactions volume is found to be stable in the
regressions for customer transactions and is therefore consistent with Harris’
(1991) eﬃciency hypothesis, this is not the case for intervention trades. I
interpret the latter result as being consistent with the view that the price
clustering in intervention trades is not inﬂuenced by SNB intervention tac-
tics. This suggests that the clustering outcome is determined by market
conditions in the dealer market.
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232425Table 1: Price Rounding in SNB Transactions (in Percent)
SNB Intervention Trades
fourth digit Total Dollar Dollar Refused Oﬀers Refused Oﬀers
Trades Purchases Sales (Bid) (Ask)
0 45.33 38.02 49.14 51.52 57.58
1 0.42 1.24 0.00 3.03 0.00
2 3.68 4.96 3.02 6.06 0.00
3 4.53 4.55 4.53 9.09 6.06
4 0.71 0.00 1.08 0.00 0.00
5 34.41 36.36 33.41 27.27 24.24
6 0.71 0.41 0.86 0.00 3.03
7 4.67 8.68 2.59 3.03 3.03
8 4.82 4.55 4.96 0.00 3.03
9 0.71 1.24 0.43 0.00 3.03
0 and 5 79.74 74.38 82.55 78.79 81.82
Even ticks 55.25 47.94 59.08 57.58 63.64
Odd ticks 44.74 52.07 40.96 42.42 36.36
NOB 706 242 464 33 33
Notes: Price clustering is for the fourth digit in the Swiss franc/U.S. dollar exchange
rate. NOB refers to number of observations. All values are in percent.

















Notes: Price clustering is for the fourth digit in the Swiss franc/U.S. dollar exchange
rate. NOB refers to number of observations. All values are in percent.
27Table 2: Sign-Rank Tests for the Fourth Digit (1986-1995)
Fourth Digit ‘0’=‘5’ ‘3’=‘7’ ‘8’=‘2’ ‘4’=‘6’ ‘1’=‘9’
Interventions 0.001 1.000 0.366 1.000 0.727
(0.001) (0.901) (0.302) (1.000) (0.547)
Customer Trans. 0.000 0.723 0.224 0.000 1.000
(0.000) (0.657) (0.194) (0.000) (1.000)
Notes: Fourth digit is the y digit of the CHF/USD exchange rate ’x.xxxy’.
Values are the signiﬁcance of a 0.01% test of the null hypothesis that the
median diﬀerence between two matched series is zero. Values given in parentheses
are signiﬁcance levels of the Wilcoxian sign test.
28Table 3: Regression Results - Price Clustering of SNB Interventions
Ending in ‘0’
Constant -0.4039 -0.3824 -0.4500 -0.4623 -0.5220
(0.2367) (0.2368) (0.3115) (0.3125) (0.4763)
DomBankt -0.3487 -0.5204* -0.5182* -0.5104* -0.5147*
(0.2101) (0.2457) (0.2458) (0.2462) (0.2469)
BigBankt 0.2510 0.2543 0.2434 0.2362
(0.1851) (0.1853) (0.1864) (0.1871)






V olt 0.0577* 0.0546* 0.0548* 0.0550* 0.0657*
(0.1829) (0.0184) (0.0184) (0.0184) (0.0205)
Log L -479.56 -478.64 -478.58 -478.42 -474.26
Cases correct 417 418 418 418 405
NOB 706 706 706 706 701
Notes: Table continues on next page.
29Table 3: (continued) Regression Results - Price Clustering of SNB Interventions
Ending in ‘5’
Constant -1.0367* -1.0372* -0.9800* -0.9849* -1.2120*
(0.2644) (0.2648) (0.3364) (0.3372) (0.5060)
DomBankt 0.7084* 0.7120* 0.7102* 0.7135* 0.7078*
(0.2442) (0.2752) (0.2753) (0.2757) (0.2762)
BigBankt -0.0054 -0.0083 -0.0127 -0.0015
(0.1876) (0.1879) (0.1890) (0.1898)






V olt -0.0247 -0.0246 -0.0247 -0.0246 -0.0338
(0.0179) (0.0180) (0.0180) (0.0180) (0.0207)
Log L -449.29 -449.29 -449.26 -449.23 -445.07
Cases correct 463 463 463 463 460
NOB 706 706 706 706 701
Notes: Table continues on next page.
30Table 3: (continued) Regression Results - Price Clustering of SNB Interventions
Ending in ‘0’ or ‘5’
Constant 0.4736 0.5118 0.4692 0.4383 0.1095
(0.3032) (0.3034) (0.4008) (0.4023) (0.5832)
DomBankt 0.3334 0.1037 0.1049 0.1211 0.1098
(0.2423) (0.2791) (0.2793) (0.2799) (0.2803)
BigBankt 0.3536 0.3558 0.3341 0.3405
(0.2208) (0.2212) (0.2222) (0.2227)






V olt 0.0738* 0.0682* 0.0684* 0.0693* 0.0662*
(0.0287) (0.0287) (0.0288) (0.0289) (0.0292)
Log L -350.18 -348.92 -348.91 -348.42 -347.63
Cases correct 563 563 563 563 558
NOB 706 706 706 706 701
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to +1 if the end digit is ’0’, ’5’ or ’0’
and ’5’; otherwise 0; DomBankt is a dummy variable that the SNB intervention was transacted
with a Swiss commercial bank; BigBankt is the same as Domestic Bank but is applied to
Switzerland’s big four banks; Repeatt is a dummy variable controlling for successive same day
interventions; Loct is a dummy variable controlling for the location of the counterparty; Timet is
time of transaction; V olt is the interventions size in US dollars. Values in parentheses are
standard errors and * denotes signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
31Table 4: Regressions: Price Clustering of SNB Customer Transactions
Ending in ‘0’
Constant -1.4591* -1.5939* -1.5995*
(0.2166) (0.2286) (0.2474)






V olt -0.0186* -0.0189* -0.0188*
(0.0066) (0.0066) (0.0072)
Log L -381.67 -379.41 -360.27
Cases correct 600 600 560
NOB 765 765 718
Notes: Table continues on next page.
32Table 4: (Continued) Price Clustering of SNB Customer Transactions
Ending in ‘5’
Constant -2.5436* -2.4689* -2.5239*
(0.2166) (0.2538) (0.2722)






V olt -0.0021 -0.0023 -0.0100*
(0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0047)
Log L -332.81 -332.17 -313.44
Cases correct 630 630 590
NOB 765 765 718
Notes: Table continues on next page.
33Table 4: (Continued) Price Clustering of SNB Customer Transactions
Ending in ‘0’ or ‘5’
Constant -1.0913* -1.1435* -1.1983*
(0.1696) (0.1791) (0.1941)






V olt -0.0122* -0.0122* -0.0107*
(0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0045)
Log L -464.58 -464.13 -438.16
Cases correct 507 507 478
NOB 765 765 718
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to +1 if the end digit is ’0’, ’5’
or ’0’ and ’5’; otherwise 0; BISt is a dummy variable if the SNB customer transaction
was transacted with the BIS; Repeatt is a dummy variable controlling for successive same
day transactions; Timet is time of transaction; V olt is the interventions size in US dollars.
Values in parentheses are standard errors and * denotes signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
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